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ABSTRACT 
 
This essay mounts an immanent critique of Dworkin’s defense of 
judicial review. Taking Dworkin’s methodology of constructive 
interpretation as my starting point, I argue that when analyzing the role that 
political institutions play in democracy, Dworkin fails to take his own 
method far enough. In particular, he limits his constructive interpretation 
of democracy to the practice of voting, overlooking the distinctive 
democratic values implicit within the institutions and practices of 
legislation by representative assembly. Ironically, given his well-known 
critique of majoritarian democracy, this failure leads Dworkin to adopt 
majoritarianism as a starting point when assessing particular institutions. 
A more thoroughgoing interpretation of democratic practices would 
identify certain nonmajoritarian virtues of legislatures, making the case for 
judicial review less clear-cut than Dworkin’s incomplete interpretation 
suggests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the constitutional lawyers and political theorists to address the 
issue, Ronald Dworkin has gone the furthest in developing a fully-fledged 
argument designed to disabuse us of any democratic uneasiness that we 
might have about judicial review.2 Dworkin had no time for those cautious 
theories that, out of fear of offending principles of democracy, seek some 
strategy to avoid judges having to invoke substantive value grounds to 
support their decisions.3 Nor would Dworkin rest with the intuitively 
attractive response that, while judicial review might not be a democratic 
procedure, it is nevertheless justified by other political values, such as 
freedom, equality or justice.4 Judicial review, Dworkin tells us, protects 
substantive democratic values, so that when a judge uses her own 
interpretation of what amounts to ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ or ‘equal 
protection of the laws’, for instance, she is doing precisely what democracy 
requires of her. 
Dworkin’s theory rubs up against two convictions that many people 
 
 
2 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, chap 10 (1986), What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 
U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter What is Equality?]; Equality, Democracy and Constitution: we the 
people in court, XXVIII ALBERTA LAW REVIEW 324, 329 (1990) [hereinafter Equality, Democracy and 
Constitution]; FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION chap 1 
(1996) [hereinafter FREEDOM’S LAW]; JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, chap 18 (2011). 
3 Classic works along such lines include L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, 
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986); JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
4 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991). 
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hold more or less instinctively: the first is that democracy requires a 
decision-procedure that is at least roughly majoritarian; the second is that 
judges ought not to rely on their own political opinions but instead base their 
decisions on the law. Dworkin’s response to the first is that the ‘majoritarian 
premise’5 relies on a crudely statistical conception of collective action, 
which conflates it with a mere aggregation of individual actions. If we take 
seriously the claim that democracy means collective self-rule, Dworkin 
argues, we should view democracy as a form of partnership between all 
citizens acting collectively. This does not require majoritarian decision-
making, but it does require protecting all citizens’ rights to ensure each is 
treated as a true member of the partnership.6 
To the concern that judges should follow the law and not their own 
personal views, Dworkin’s response is to deny the distinction, at least in 
such hard-and-fast terms. When Dworkin says that judges should bring their 
own convictions to bear on constitutional issues he means neither that they 
should rely on brute subjective ‘political preferences’ nor that they should 
attempt to divine some transcendental ‘natural law’. Rather, the values 
deployed by the Dworkinian judge are to be found embedded within extant 
legal and political practices.7 Thus, says Dworkin, when a court strikes 
down legislation on the basis of a ‘moral reading’ of the constitution, it is 
not arrogantly raising itself above the rest of society, but endeavoring to 
remain faithful to the ongoing practice of self-government and to the core 
values of the political community.8 
Criticisms of Dworkin’s defense of judicial review tend to target either 
his anti-majoritarianism or his claim that a constructive interpretation of the 
constitution can yield a set of principles of political morality that is 
distinguishable from the individual value orientations of particular justices.9 
In this essay I mount an attack from the opposite direction. Rather than 
criticizing the methodology of constructive interpretation, I argue that 
 
 
5 As he calls it in FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 1, at 19. 
6 Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, at 337ff; FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 1, at 20ff; 
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 384. 
7 See generally LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 1, passim. 
8 LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 1, 399; FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 1, 32-5. 
9 For a critique of Dworkin’s anti-majoritarianism see Jeremy Waldron, The Constitutional Conception 
of Democracy, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 282 (1999). Scepticism about the ability of constructive 
interpretation to yield a coherent set of principles distinct from the value orientations of the individual 
judge is a common theme in across some otherwise very different criticisms of Dworkin, for example: 
John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7 PHIL. AND PUB. AFFAIRS 3 (1977); Andrew Altman, Legal 
Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. AND PUB. AFFAIRS 205 (1986); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Michael W McConnell, The Importance 
of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997). 
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Dworkin does not carry it through fully enough. Dworkin employs 
constructive interpretation to derive the moral reading of the constitution, 
and he applies it to the practice of voting to discern the symbolic values of 
the electoral system (which, he argues, are not threatened by judicial 
review). I agree with Dworkin that such interpretation reveals values 
immanent within the political practices of western democracies. But 
Dworkin’s interpretation of democracy pulls up short. His presentation of 
representative institutions as being of purely instrumental value amounts to 
a failure to interpret constructively the practice of legislation. In fact, the 
symbolic significance of courts and legislatures is ‘thicker’ than Dworkin 
recognizes, and thus his defense of judicial review is altogether too quick. 
Furthermore, and perhaps ironically, Dworkin’s failure in this regard 
manifests itself in a curious priority that is granted to majoritarianism in his 
account of democracy. Limiting his interpretation of democracy to the 
practice of voting leads him to accept majoritarianism as a basic starting 
point from which departures must be justified on instrumental (i.e. output-
related) grounds. But a more thoroughgoing constructive interpretation of 
the practice of legislation by representative assembly would find that it 
promotes values that are neither majoritarian nor instrumental. Legislative 
procedures express a commitment to the ideal that government ought to be 
steered not simply by a statistical majority opinion, but by a discursive and 
inclusive public opinion. Once this is recognized, then the case for judicial 
review becomes, at the very least, rather less clear-cut. 
The structure of this essay is as follows: In the first section I give an 
overview of Dworkin’s methodology of constructive interpretation, 
enriching it with insights from Charles Taylor, who has, in a somewhat 
different register, developed a similar approach. The second section then 
examines Dworkin’s conception of democracy. The third section sets out 
Dworkin’s institutionalization of democracy and his defense of judicial 
review. In section four I argue that the very virtue that seems to recommend 
courts as arbiters of disputes over the extent of fundamental rights – their 
impartiality – is linked with a way of thinking about constitutional politics 
that is problematic for democracy, casting doubt on Dworkin’s claim that 
judicial review provides an arena of contestation that is ‘directly connected 
to [citizens’] moral lives’.10 In the final section I argue that Dworkin 
overlooks the indispensable role that the representative legislature plays as 
the focal point of political debate. Although legislatures do not, of course, 
always live up to the ideal, if we overlook the part that legislatures play in 
the symbolic constitution of the political community we risk losing grasp of 
 
 
10 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29. 
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an important aspect of democracy’s value. 
I. THE METHODOLOGY OF CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION 
Dworkin’s philosophy is characterized by a staunch refusal to address 
questions about the meaning of concepts in a way that is divorced from our 
everyday understandings of those concepts and the practices in which they 
feature. While the likes of G.A. Cohen would have us ‘retreat to justice in 
its purity,’ to find a concept that ‘transcends the fact of the world,’11 
Dworkin maintains that a normative political theory must take the form of 
a constructive interpretation of existing practices. 
Constructive interpretation requires us to adopt what Dworkin calls the 
‘interpretive attitude,’ a stance with two components. Firstly, someone who 
holds the interpretive attitude towards a practice believes that the practice 
does not simply exist as a matter of descriptive fact, but that it ‘serves some 
interest or purpose or enforces some principle,’ that is to say, it has a certain 
value.12 Secondly, she will view the true requirements of the practice as not 
purely a matter of convention, but rather as sensitive to the practice’s point, 
so that what the practice truly requires is not necessarily what the practice 
has historically been taken to require. On this view, practice and value are 
conceptually indissociable. As Dworkin puts it: ‘Value and content have 
become entangled.’13 
Dworkin draws an analogy between interpretation of a social practice 
and interpretation of art and literature: in each case interpreters aim to 
construct an account of something that has been created by a person or 
persons but that exists as an independent entity separate from its creator(s). 
Constructive interpretation, be it of a social practice or of a piece of art, 
involves ‘imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it 
the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong.’14 Note that an interpretation does not simply deduce but proposes 
value for a practice. Just as a set of scientific data will always be compatible 
with more than one explanation, so too will the brute facts about people’s 
behavior be consistent with more than one interpretation of the value 
implicit in a practice. There is no value-neutral mechanism for determining 
between competing interpretations: Our choice must reflect our view of 
which interpretation proposes the most value for the practice, i.e. which 
 
 
11 G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 291 (2008). 
12 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 47. 
13 Id. at 48 
14 Id. at 52. 
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portrays the practice in its ‘best light.’15 It follows, of course, that 
interpretation is a controversial activity: Different persons’ interpretations 
will conflict, and thus stand in competition with one another. 
Dworkin provides a useful three-stage heuristic for thinking about what 
interpretation of a practice involves.16 In the first, ‘preinterpretive’ stage, we 
identify the rules and standards that we take, provisionally, to provide the 
content of the practice. We then move to the ‘interpretive’ stage, at which 
we settle on some general justification for the main elements of the practice, 
i.e. an account of what value the practice realizes and how it does so. Such 
an account must combine two dimensions of interpretation: Our theory must 
at once both ‘fit’ and ‘justify’ our practice. Finally comes the 
‘postinterpretive’ stage, in which we adjust our sense of what the practice 
‘really’ requires so as better to serve the value that we have identified. 
Dworkin’s schema is helpful so long as we do not mistake it for a concrete 
procedure that we must always self-consciously follow, or (worse) an 
algorithm for success. The three ‘stages’ of interpretation are not 
analytically discrete. Dworkin makes clear that even at the preinterpretive 
stage, a degree of interpretation is necessary in order to identify the object 
of the interpretation.17 Furthermore, the progression through the three stages 
is not linear: At any point the interpreter could find, for example, that there 
is no way of reconciling any general justification with the practice he is 
interpreting and so be forced to return to the preinterpretive stage to see if 
some different initial selection would be more fruitful. The different stages 
of interpretation do not so much flow in chronological progression as sit in 
a kind of reflective equilibrium. Nevertheless, the three stages – (1) 
identifying and individuating a practice, (2) deriving an account of its value, 
and (3) making proposals for reform – correspond to tasks a sound 
interpretation must complete. 
How do we decide which interpretation of a practice is the most 
attractive? What does it mean for an interpretation to portray a practice in 
its ‘best light’? We cannot hope to stand outside of our practices in order to 
judge putative interpretations from an Archimedean perspective. We can 
only assess interpretations from a viewpoint that is internal to the practices 
 
 
15 Id. at 47. 
16 Id. at 65-66. 
17 Hart, in his postscript to The Concept of Law, misunderstood this aspect of Dworkin’s methodology. 
Hart argued that the identification of rules and standards at the preinterpretive stage presupposes the 
existence of a fact-based test for law. See, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 266 (3rd ed. 2012). 
However, Dworkin does not, as Hart describes, take ‘preinterpretive’ law as ‘settled’, and interpret it as 
if it were somehow axiomatic. Constructive interpretation is only complete if the subject-matter chosen 
in the preinterpretive stage turns out, in light of the work at the interpretive and postinterpretive stages, 
to be a set of true paradigm instances of the practice. 
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themselves; there is no higher court to appeal to. The test of an interpretation 
is accordingly whether it is able to formulate more explicitly what it is that 
we are already doing, by capturing the significance of those aspects of 
activity and norms of behavior that are most central to the practice. This is 
not to say the role of interpretation is simply to tell us what we already 
know. Indeed, a theory may provide a perspicuous account of a practice 
while challenging the views of those engaging in it, perhaps by highlighting 
an aspect of the world that had previously gone unnoticed. Dworkin’s 
interpretation of law, for example, claims that our existing legal practice 
presupposes the central importance of the value of integrity, even though 
such a value has not been explicitly recognized by legal actors. Imputing a 
concern for integrity to legal actors helps explain their behavior in an 
attractive way, and thus renders the practice of law more luculent.18 
Since an interpretation of a practice will usually recommend changes 
to the way in which the practice is carried out, the process of elucidating a 
practice is indissociable from the process of its appraisal. This connection 
between the explanatory and the normative has been neatly expressed by 
Taylor: ‘What makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; 
that its adoption makes possible what is in some sense a more effective 
practice.’19 Like a map, the test of a theory is how well we can use it to get 
around: Whether it renders our action less ‘haphazard and contradictory,’ 
and more ‘clairvoyant.’20 If a new interpretation gains widespread 
acceptance, then the practice itself is likely to alter, since people will 
approach the practice somewhat differently if convinced of the challenging 
theory. Successful interpretation is therefore capable of giving rise to a 
virtuous circle in which interpretive insight and improvements to the 
practice feed off one another. As Dworkin puts it: ‘Interpretation folds back 
into the practice, altering its shape, and the new shape encourages further 
reinterpretation, so the practice changes dramatically, though each step in 
the progress is interpretive of what the last achieved.’21 
Dworkin’s methodology, then, is based on the idea that our political 
practices have certain meanings embedded within them—meanings which, 
as Taylor has put it, ‘are not subjective meanings, the property of one or 
 
 
18 Dworkin draws an analogy to the discovery of the planet Neptune: ‘Astronomers postulated Neptune 
before they discovered it. They knew that only another planet, whose orbit lay beyond those already 
recognized, could explain the behaviour of the nearer planets. Our instincts about internal compromise 
suggest another political ideal standing behind justice and fairness. Integrity is our Neptune.’ DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 183. 
19 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOCIAL THEORY AS PRACTICE 104 (1983). 
20 Id. at 111. 
21 LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 48. 
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some individuals, but rather intersubjective meanings, which are 
constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and 
act’.22 Constructive interpretation is a matter of bringing these meanings out 
into the open, so as to enable the values that they embody to be identified 
and pursued more effectively. When examining Dworkin’s theory of 
democracy, we should keep in mind his underlying commitment to this 
interpretive method. 
II. THE ‘PARTICIPATORY VALUES’ OF DEMOCRACY 
In the fourth of his ‘What is Equality?’ papers, Dworkin draws a 
distinction between what he calls ‘detached’ and ‘dependent’ conceptions 
of democracy.23 He describes detached conceptions as based on input, i.e. 
they judge the democratic character of a political system by looking solely 
at its procedural aspects, asking whether it distributes political power 
equally amongst citizens.24 Dependent conceptions, on the other hand, are 
described as outcome-based, such that they recommend as democratic 
whatever political system is most likely to lead to the best substantive 
consequences.25 Now it might seem that the distinction between detached 
and dependent conceptions corresponds to the distinction between 
noninstrumental and instrumental views of democracy respectively.26 
However, that is not the case, since Dworkin includes as ‘consequences’ of 
a political system not only the ‘distributive’ consequences (such as the rates 
of taxation and public spending, the substance of the rules of property, 
contract and tort, and so on), but also what he calls ‘participatory’ 
consequences: ‘The consequences that flow from the character and 
distribution of political activity itself.’27 Dworkin identifies three types of 
participatory consequence: the ‘symbolic value’ of the confirmation of the 
status of citizens as free and equal; the ‘agency value’ which accrues when 
politics is connected to each individual’s moral experience; and the 
‘communal value’ of a cohesive and fraternal political community.28 
By including ‘participatory consequences’ as part of his ‘dependent’ 
conception, Dworkin recognizes the noninstrumental, expressive value of 
 
 
22 Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 3, 27 (1971). 
23 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 3-8. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. 
26 For an overview of the distinction between noninstrumental and instrumental views of democracy, see 
Tom Christiano, Democracy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy/. 
27 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 4. 
28 Id. at 4. 
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democracy.29 Dworkin’s symbolic, agency and communal values are not 
‘consequences’ in the instrumental, empirical sense. Unlike the 
‘distributive’ consequences of a political process, the values of political 
equality, agency and community cannot be conceptually separated from the 
practice of democracy that gives rise to them. It is not quite right to say that 
democracy produces these values; rather we would say that democracy 
expresses or honors such values.30 We can note here that Dworkin’s 
‘symbolic’ value is misleadingly named: All of the participatory 
consequences rely on the symbolic status of democratic practices and 
institutions in order to bear the expressive significance that they do. 
The value that Dworkin calls the ‘symbolic’ value would perhaps be 
better referred to as ‘political equality;’ Dworkin also describes it as ‘a 
declaration of equal standing for all’.31 Dworkin associates this value with 
voting rights, such that one-person-one-vote signifies a commitment to the 
equal status of all citizens. But, as Dworkin rightly acknowledges, the shape 
voting rights must take in order to successfully symbolize equality depends 
upon contingent historical factors: 
 
Our own history is such that no deviation from equal impact 
within a district – no deviation, that is, from equal vote – is 
tolerable for us. That strict requirement would not necessarily 
hold in a community whose history showed that unequal voting 
did not itself display contempt or disregard. We can imagine, for 
example, a society in which people gain votes as they grow older, 
or in which people acquire more votes by pursuing a course of 
study genuinely open to everyone, or something of that sort. But 
in a society like our own, in which the vote has traditionally been 
an emblem of responsibility, weight, and stake, any violation of 
equal vote would reflect a denial of the symbolic attachment 
equal vote confirms.32 
 
 
29 See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 21-3 (2004). 
30 See Philip Pettit, Consequentialism and Respect for Persons, 100 ETHICS 116 (1989) (On the 
distinction between producing and honouring values); See also Ben Bradley, Two Concepts of Intrinsic 
Value, 9 ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE 111 (2006). 
31 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 19. 
32 Id. at 19-20. It is worth noting that ‘one-person-one-vote’ still does not fully characterize US voting 
law, since the majority of states practice some form of felon disenfranchisement. The significance of 
historical factors can be seen acutely here, since given the historic legacy of institutionalized racism in 
the US, the fact that felon disenfranchisement disproportionately impacts African Americans creates (at 
the very least) a suspicion that this group are not yet fully accepted as equals. (See Alec C Ewald, Felon 
Disenfranchisement, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 367 (David Schultz and 
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Here Dworkin recognizes that what amounts to an insult to citizens’ 
political equality depends upon shared understandings which afford 
significance to particular features of the practice. Unlike, say, physical 
injury, insult is not a simple consequence of a perpetrator’s acts. Rather, it 
can only be inflicted where there exists a shared background understanding 
that certain actions bear a certain significance. Because of the particular 
understanding of the significance of voting that is prevalent in modern 
western societies, the symbolic status of voting rights entail that one-person-
one-vote is an essential requirement of democracy as we know it. 
It does not follow that the symbolic expression of political equality 
requires that each citizen has equal impact on political ‘outputs’. Such a 
requirement would rule out representative government altogether, since a 
representative structure is necessarily one that gives greater impact to 
legislators over ordinary citizens.33 Furthermore, history does not afford a 
strong symbolic role to equality in the way in which the community is 
divided into electoral districts: For instance it does not convey disrespect 
for the people of California that they have far less impact on the 
constituency of the US Senate than do the citizens of Wyoming.34  
If the nature of the ‘symbolic’ value of political equality is 
straightforward enough, Dworkin’s discussion of the ‘agency’ value is a 
little more cryptic. The agency value accrues, he says, when politics 
connects ‘each individual, to his or her own moral experience’35, so that ‘our 
political life [is] a satisfactory extension of our moral life’.36 While it is not 
made completely explicit, Dworkin’s discussion of the agency value 
recognizes two important characteristics of democracy: Democracy is both 
practical and social. Democracy is essentially practical in the sense that 
democratic processes would not have the same expressive significance were 
it not for the fact that we are able to use them to make important decisions 
competently.37 It is therefore crucial that those aspects of democracy that 
have socially-recognized symbolic significance are also of practical import. 
It is only because voting is a practical act of moral agency that the right to 
vote can serve as a symbol of respect: A merely symbolic election would 
fail in this regard. And it is also crucial that democratic politics is a social 
pursuit. It is not adequate, for democratic citizenship, to allow each person 
freely to contemplate political issues in private. It is central to one’s status 
 
 
John R Vile, eds., 2005).) 
33 Id. at 10-11. 
34 Id. at 20. 
35 Id. at 5. 
36 Id. at 21. 
37 GUTMANN AND THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 22. 
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as a citizen that one is able to engage in discourse with others and try to 
persuade them to accept one’s own point of view. 
Finally, Dworkin’s ‘communal’ value of democracy refers to the idea 
of self-government.38 In a genuine democracy, the laws are created by the 
collective agency of the people acting as a whole. A citizen who dissents 
from a political decision can only be expected to accept that he is 
nevertheless party to self-government if he has a sense that he belongs to a 
political community that transcends the particular decision with which he 
disagrees. This requires that we take ‘the people’ to be a distinct entity, 
capable of acting in a way irreducible to any statistical function of the 
actions of individual citizens.39 Dworkin calls this view the ‘partnership 
conception of democracy,’ since ‘it holds that self-government means 
government not by the majority of people exercising authority over 
everyone but by the people as a whole acting as partners.’40  As Dworkin 
makes clear, this is not such a mysterious phenomenon as it might at first 
glance appear. He borrows from Rawls the example of an orchestra: It is 
essential to an orchestral performance not just that a set of musicians 
simultaneously play some appropriate score, but that the musicians play as 
an orchestra, each intending to make a contribution to the performance of 
the group, rather than isolated individual recitations.41 This does not depend 
on any ontological priority of community over individual, but simply on a 
certain kind of shared attitude among individuals. Democracy enables 
citizens taking part in political action to view themselves (authentically)42 
 
 
38 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 5. 
39 Bratman has proffered a ‘reductive’ account of collective agency which is expressed purely ‘in terms 
of the attitudes and actions of the individuals involved’ MICHAEL BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 108 (1999); see generally chaps 5-8. On Bratman’s 
account, a group engages in what he calls ‘shared cooperative activity’ when each of its members: (i) 
intend that the group carry out some joint activity; (ii) are mutually responsive to one another’s intentions 
and actions; (iii) are committed to the success of the activity; (iv) are committed to supporting one 
another in the pursuance of the activity; and (v) are led to carry out the joint activity by virtue of their 
attitudes (i) – (iv). Bratman’s aims are explicitly functionalist: ‘What we want to show is that intentions 
of individuals with these special contents should lead to planning, bargaining and action of those 
individuals which, taken together, constitute appropriately coordinated planning and unified shared 
activity.’ (Id. at 123.) He takes the fact that the complex of interlocking intentions (i) – (iv) is likely to 
lead consistently mutually-supportive action as evidence that it adequately explains the phenomenon of 
joint action. However, (i) seems tacitly to assume what Bratman is at odds to deny: the existence of an 
ontologically irreducible collective agent. More generally, Bratman’s functionalist approach is incapable 
of capturing what we might call the ethical significance of joint action: i.e. the fact that joint action is 
qualitatively, and not just functionally, different from a set of mutually responsive individual actions.  
40 JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 384. 
41 Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, at 329. 
42 I add this parenthesis to underline the fact that collective agency here is not merely a subjective matter: 
it depends on, but cannot be reduced to, individual opinions about the nature of the action. It is crucial 
for democracy that citizens are not brainwashed or misled into thinking that they are engaged in a joint 
  
 
 
 
 
166 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:155 
 
 
 
as engaged in a joint venture, such that—like musicians in an orchestra—
they can each share in the credit due for the achievements of the community 
as a whole. 
 
III. DWORKIN’S ATTEMPT AT INSTITUTIONALIZING DEMOCRACY 
Dworkin claims that the participatory values recommend a basic 
outline of a democratic structure, leaving open a number of specifics to be 
crafted so as to deal with localized requirements.43 The ‘symbolic’ value, as 
we have seen, requires equality of vote within electoral districts. The 
‘agency’ value requires that citizens are guaranteed the freedom to express 
their opinions, and that they have ‘enough access to influential media . . . to 
give each person a fair chance to influence others if he or she can.’44 And 
the ‘communal’ value demands that ‘collective decisions must reflect equal 
concern for the interests of all members.’45 As Dworkin sees it, the symbolic 
value of equal voting rights sets a default of equality of impact between 
citizens, from which we should not depart unless two conditions are met: 
firstly, the different procedure must not outrage any of the participatory 
values; and secondly, we must have some positive reason to think that a 
different procedure would considerably improve the quality of political 
decisions.  
The first condition rules out formal electoral discriminations, such as 
restriction of the franchise to men, whites, property-holders and so on, or 
any proposal that would give weightier votes to classes of persons thought 
more likely to make good decisions on political issues.46 It does not, 
however, rule out representative government, since this lowers the political 
impact of all citizens, and thus ‘disenfranchises all unelected groups and 
persons equally.’47 Furthermore, Dworkin says, we have a positive reason 
to think representation improves the quality of political decisions, since 
‘elected officials, rather than popular assemblies, are better able to protect 
individual rights from dangerous swings in public opinion’.48 He 
 
 
venture: the sense of joint venture must be authentic. 
43 See, e.g., JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 398-9. 
44 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 22. 
45 Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, at 339. 
46 With what I think is a pinch of self-deprecating humour, Dworkin gives the example of a proposal 
‘that only lawyers and moral philosophers should be allowed to vote on choice-insensitive matters.’ See 
What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 27. Dworkin does not specify whether he is using ‘and’ in the 
conjunctive or the disjunctive. 
47 JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 393. 
48 Id. at 394. 
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accordingly concludes that both conditions for departure from equality of 
impact are met in the case of representative government, so that there can 
be no general democratic requirement that laws, even on issues of 
fundamental importance, be put to referendums. Issues of detail, such as the 
lengths of parliamentary terms, the system of election and the makeup of 
electoral districts, must be looked at in the context of the particular 
community for which they are being considered. 
He addresses the question of judicial review in similar manner. Judicial 
review clearly creates a vast disparity of political impact: It gives a handful 
of judges the power to overrule policies that are supported by the 
overwhelming majority of the populace. But, Dworkin argues, the first 
condition for departure from equal impact is nevertheless met. Firstly, he 
claims, judicial review does not impair the symbolic value of equal voting 
rights, since it does not reflect any contempt for or disregard of any group 
within the community.49 Secondly, judicial review supports the ‘agency 
value’, by providing ‘a forum of politics in which citizens may participate, 
argumentatively, if they wish, and therefore in a manner more directly 
connected to their moral lives than voting almost ever is.’50 Finally, judicial 
review promotes the communal value of democracy, since in upholding 
individual rights against government violations, it preserves the political 
community as an inclusive democratic community.51 He accordingly gives 
us an account of judicial review as a kind of democratic prophylactic: 
Without insulting the status of citizens as equals, it protects the community 
against legislative decisions that would tend to eat away at the egalitarian 
basis on which it is founded. This still leaves open the second condition, 
whether judicial review in fact improves the substantive quality of political 
decisions. Like the issues surrounding the detail of the electoral system, an 
answer to this question will depend upon a host of factors that vary from 
place to place. Nothing guarantees in advance that judicial review will make 
a community more democratic, and Dworkin floats the possibility that other 
strategies for protecting individual rights against majority domination might 
prove superior.52 Nevertheless, Dworkin is confident that in most, if not all 
actually existing cases, judicial review has had a positive effect. 
 
 
49 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29; Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, at 337-9; 
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 396. 
50 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29. See also Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, 
at 340-2; and JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 396-8. 
51 Equality, Democracy and Constitution, supra note 1, at 342-6; JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 
1, at 398. 
52 JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 398-9. Dworkin gives the example of an elected upper 
chamber, though it is not clear why he believes the upper chamber need be elected. 
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Accordingly, he concludes that judicial review is generally a benefit to 
democracy. 
IV.  COURT AS SYMBOL: THE MYTH OF LEGALITY AND THE NEGATIVE 
CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP 
Judicial review does not place decisions about fundamental rights into 
the hands of just any set of experts: It places them specifically into the hands 
of a court. Courts enjoy a particular status in the popular imagination. To 
put it crudely, people have a generally shared sense of what courts are for, 
and this sense affects both how judges, lawyers and parties to court cases 
behave and how the public responds to their behavior. The expressive 
significance of judicial review will hang upon the basic shared 
understandings of what it means for a controversy to be decided judicially. 
In this section, I argue that the symbolic significance of courts is ‘thicker’ 
than Dworkin recognizes, such that his argument that judicial review does 
not impede the agency and communal values is altogether too quick. 
Dworkin’s defense of judicial review relies on the status of courts in 
the popular imagination. Dworkin needs to be able to answer the question 
of why judicial review should signify a concern for equality rather than a 
desire to place government in the hands of an elite: Why is it democratic 
and not aristocratic? He can answer this question because at a fundamental, 
abstract level, citizens in western democracies share a set of understandings 
that distinguish courts from aristocratic bodies. Judges are associated with 
a particular set of virtues—virtues of impartiality, rationality and fairness—
and not with superiority or excellence simpliciter. The narrative that 
justifies their authority speaks of professional learning and institutional 
independence, not of their possessing gold in their soul.53 It is this narrative 
that allows Dworkin to differentiate judicial review from aristocracy, and 
thus conclude that judicial review does not symbolize a lack of respect for 
any section of the community. 
However, as scholars of cultural symbolism have pointed out, symbols 
often ‘condense many references, uniting them in a single cognitive and 
affective field.’54 Those seeking to defend a political institution must take 
its significance in its entirety; one cannot pick-and-choose those aspects of 
symbolic significance that are desirable and hope to discard the others. In 
the case of courts, the very virtue that seems to recommend them as arbiters 
 
 
53 Cf PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book III, 415a (H. D. P. Lee tr., 2d ed. 2007). 
54 VICTOR W. TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY 55 
(1974); see also, VICTOR W. TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 27-30 
(1967). 
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of disputes over the extent of fundamental rights—their impartiality—is 
linked with a way of thinking about constitutional politics that is 
problematic for democracy. 
For a number of decades now political scientists have puzzled over 
what they have come to call the ‘myth of legality’: the notion that judicial 
decision-making is somehow a ‘nonpolitical’ process.55 Empirical 
investigations have found such a view to be widely held (at least in the 
US),56 although it is not entirely clear what is meant by ‘nonpolitical’ in this 
context, and a number of studies show citizens holding apparently 
contradictory views.57 The tenor of much of the political science literature 
tends to suggest that the myth of legality is, in the words of Caldeira, ‘silly 
formalism,’ that ‘no one who has taken Introduction to American 
Government . . . is going to ascribe to.’58 But, as Caldeira goes on to point 
out, this attitude simplistically equates the myth of legality with acceptance 
of what Pound derided long ago as ‘mechanical jurisprudence.’59 The myth, 
however, should not be seen as acceptance of any particular jurisprudential 
theory, nor, indeed, as the acceptance of any particular theory at all. In fact, 
we need some sort of ‘myth’ of legality in order to accept the very idea of 
law. To be clear, by myth I do not mean ‘a widely held misconception,’ but 
rather ‘a symbolic narrative.’60 Myths are the stories that we tell ourselves 
so as to bring order to a complex and potentially chaotic world. ‘Law’ is not 
a natural kind, an a priori concept or the product of pure rational thought; it 
is a frame through which we organize aspects of our social and political life, 
and it is sustained by the sharing of a set of reassuring, widely-recognized 
 
 
55 See Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: an empirical investigation, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
385 (1974); Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: an assessment of survey evidence, 11 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 427 (1977); Dean Jaros and Robert Roper, The Supreme Court, Myth, Diffuse Support, 
Specific Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 557 (1980); John M. Scheb II and William Lyons, The 
Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000); Sara C 
Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. POL. 697 (2006); JAMES L. GIBSON 
AND GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE 
JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009). 
56 A certain caution about drawing generalized conclusions from this empirical data is due owing to the 
fact that almost all studies have been conducted in the US. However, James L Gibson et al have found 
evidence of similar attitudes in a number of EU countries: see James L. Gibson et al, On the Legitimacy 
of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998). 
57 For an overview, see James L Gibson and Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme 
Court: conventional wisdoms and recent challenges thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 209-12 
(2014). 
58 Gregory A Caldeira, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 485, 485 (1994), reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD 
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL. 
59 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUMBIA L. REV. 605 (1908). 
60 The former definition is from the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2000), the latter from the 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 1994). 
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symbols.61  
I therefore do not think we should be surprised by the fact that the 
‘myth of legality’ appears to be widespread, or that its content lacks clarity. 
What the empirical studies show is citizens struggling to articulate verbally 
certain inchoate understandings that are usually expressed symbolically. 
The way in which the courts are ‘different’ from ‘political’ actors does not 
permit straightforward definition, but it is nevertheless deeply ingrained into 
our structures of thought and behavior.62 It is this understanding that enables 
us to see courts as ‘impartial’ arbiters. They are certainly not impartial in 
the sense of not being affected by the outcome of decisions: Judges, like the 
rest of us, must obey the law. Nor are they impartial in the sense that they 
may reach decisions by recourse to some algorithm that spares them the 
need to make normative judgments: This kind of ‘formalism’ is indeed 
‘silly’. Their impartiality comes from the fact that they are bound to ‘legal’ 
as opposed to ‘political’ considerations. And while there are countless 
competing theories about precisely what this entails for judicial decision-
making, these theories only make sense on the understanding that courts are 
different from the ‘political’ branches of government, i.e. that the distinction 
between law and politics has at least some substance. It is this widely shared 
background understanding that allows us to see judicial review as premised 
on a liberal ideal of impartiality rather than on an aristocratic supposition of 
judicial superiority. 
The difficulty with this, however, is that background understandings 
frame not only the decision-process (nemo judex in causa sua, audi alteram 
partem, etc.), but also the subject-matter of the decision itself. By sending 
questions about fundamental rights to the courts for determination, judicial 
review presents such issues as qualitatively differentiated from matters of 
‘ordinary politics.’ Furthermore, the supremacy of the courts over Congress 
promotes the idea of the supremacy of law over politics; i.e. an 
understanding of politics as being limited within the bounds set by law. This 
causes problems for both the ‘agency’ and ‘communal’ values of 
democracy. 
 
 
61 See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LAW AND POLITICS chap 2 (2000). 
62 My claim here is supported by the finding, in a number of empirical studies, that there is a positive 
correlation between strength of adherence to the ‘myth of legality’ and familiarity with/knowledge of 
the law and courts (Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth; Gibson et al, On the Legitimacy of National 
High Courts; Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts). This correlation is 
difficult to explain on the assumption that the myth is simply a falsehood, since in that case we would 
expect experience of the courts to disabuse rather than bolster it. Gibson and Caldeira conclude, sensibly, 
I think, that exposure to legitimising judicial symbols reinforces the process of distinguishing courts 
from other political institutions, so that those who are experienced with courts tend to perceive and 
evaluate their decisions through the frame of law (CITIZENS, COURTS AND CONFIRMATIONS 7-14). 
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The distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ casts doubt on 
Dworkin’s claim that judicial review provides an arena of contestation that 
is ‘directly connected to [citizens’] moral lives.’63 Sending an issue to be 
determined by the court elevates the issue to the level of constitutional law, 
and thereby marks its difference from everyday moral issues. A 
constitutional ruling presents itself not merely as one side in a moral-
political quarrel, but as an authoritative statement of the permissible 
framework within which such quarrels are to be conducted. Such statements 
are buttressed by powerful symbolism. This is most obviously manifested 
in quasi-religious courtroom design and dress and the elaborate use of 
supplicant honorifics,64 but perhaps even more important is the symbolic 
force of the ‘sacred text’ of The Constitution.65 This is not to say that judges 
are presented as infallible, or that constitutional decisions are placed beyond 
dispute, but rather that constitutional decisions may only be disputed in a 
certain register: Not the register of everyday morality, or of political action, 
but the learned, mystifying register of constitutional law. Citizens may 
indeed ‘participate, argumentatively, if they wish’66 in judicial review, but 
they can only do so in the sacred language of law. (Furthermore, if they 
expect results they are best advised to hire an acolyte to speak for them.) 
The link between the outcome and the citizens’ sense of moral agency is, I 
submit, accordingly diluted. 
The image of politics bounded by law also threatens to weaken the 
‘communal value,’ i.e. the ability for citizens to see themselves as engaged 
in a joint project of self-government. When the most basic questions about 
the principles upon which the political community is built are presented as 
questions of law, then we should not be surprised if, as de Tocqueville put 
it, ‘the spirit of the lawyer . . . infiltrates all society.’67 Judicial review places 
courts at the pinnacle of the institutional hierarchy and thus presents legal 
action as the most fundamental way in which citizens may interact with the 
political community. This projects a ‘negative’ conception of citizenship 
according to which the characteristic capacity of the citizen is the ability to 
 
 
63 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29. 
64 Note the US Supreme Court’s description of itself on its own website: The Supreme Court Building: 
America’s Temple of Justice, http://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/TempleOfJustice.aspx. See also 
MURRAY J. EDELMAN, FROM ART TO POLITICS: HOW ARTISTIC CREATIONS SHAPE POLITICAL 
CONCEPTIONS chap 5 (1995); and JEROME FRANK, The Cult of the Robe, in COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH 
AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1950). 
65 See, for example, SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
66 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29. 
67 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA Volume I, part 2, chap viii (HC Mansfield & D 
Winthrop eds. and trs., 2000). 
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secure one’s rights as against the state.68  But without wanting to downplay 
the importance of government in accordance with the law, ‘rights-retrieval’ 
is not the essence of democratic self-government.69 If citizens are to view 
themselves as engaged in a joint project of self-government, they will need 
a ‘positive’ conception of citizenship, according to which the defining 
characteristic of a citizen is a voice in deciding the laws by which the 
community defines itself. The concern here is not just the instrumental one 
that a society of individualistic rights-claimers will be unstable without 
widespread civic virtue,70 it is deeper: If people’s relationship with the state 
is defined in terms of a list of rights, the full value of self-government is not 
available to them. A claim of right is an action taken against the community, 
whereas people can only be self-governing insofar as they conceive of 
themselves as acting through the community.71 By elevating legal action to 
the highest form of citizen-participation, judicial review celebrates 
individual rights-retrieval at the expense of more collaborative forms of 
political engagement. It therefore threatens the ability of citizens to view 
themselves as a self-governing political community. 
V. LEGISLATURE AS SYMBOL: THE FOCAL POINT OF THE PRACTICE OF 
DEMOCRACY 
Probably the best known critique of Dworkin’s position—Jeremy 
Waldron’s ‘core case’ argument—attacks the inequality of impact inherent 
in a system of judicial review.72 Dworkin has responded by dismissing 
 
 
68 The classical exposition of this conception of citizenship is T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social 
Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1950). Marshall’s idea that it is through 
enjoyment of an array of liberal-democratic rights that individuals come to see themselves as full 
members of society bears more than a passing resemblance to Dworkin’s account of the ‘communal 
value’. 
69 See Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 200-2 (1995). 
70 See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); WILLIAM A GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); and RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, 
CITIZENSHIP AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM (1997). 
71 I do not, however, go so far as to say that ‘the life of the active citizen is the highest life available to 
us’ WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 294 (2d ed., 2002). 
Kymlicka wins a pyrrhic victory over ‘civic republicanism’ by presenting it as relying either on an 
instrumental conception of citizenship (and thus collapsing into ‘liberalism’) or a comprehensive 
conception of the good life (and thus placing an implausible intrinsic value on political participation) 
(Id., 294-9). My claim is not about what makes an individual human life go well, all things considered, 
it is about the kind of relationship that must pertain between citizens in order to make available a 
particular kind of value that they enjoy by virtue of membership in a democratic community. 
72 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). To summarize briefly, Waldron argues that it is 
rational and fair to resolve political disagreements by majority-decision. He claims that majority-
decision respects individuals in two ways. Firstly, it respects differences of opinion, as it does not require 
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Waldron’s argument as a majoritarian ‘fetish.’73 In this section, it will be 
suggested that Dworkin is, surprisingly perhaps, susceptible to a similar line 
of criticism himself: Like Waldron, Dworkin gives an unjustified priority to 
majoritarianism. Although he argues that representative government does 
not threaten democracy (because it improves the quality and efficiency of 
political decision-making), this is not the same as saying that it promotes 
the expressive values of democracy. Dworkin depicts representative 
government as a kind of compromise between equality of impact on one 
hand and quality of outcome on the other, seemingly without considering 
whether legislation by representative assembly has any distinctive 
democratic merit in and of itself. 
Dworkin is, of course, critical of majoritarian conceptions of 
democracy. Of his own conception, he says this: 
 
It denies that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective 
decisions always or normally be those that a majority or plurality 
of citizens would favor if fully informed and rational. It takes the 
defining aim of democracy to be a different one: that collective 
decisions be made by political institutions whose structure, 
composition, and practices treat all members of the community, 
as individuals, with equal concern and respect.74 
 
In other words: democracy is not identified by an ‘input-based’ test of 
statistical equality of impact, nor an ‘output-based’ test of majority support 
for laws. The question is to what extent citizens govern themselves 
collectively through a process that respects each of them as free and equal 
moral agents. 
Given Dworkin’s apparently unequivocal rejection of majoritarianism, 
however, we may well ask why, when appraising institutions, he takes as 
his default starting position statistical equality of impact. He is happy, of 
course, to depart from equality of impact so long as such a departure does 
 
 
any individual’s opinion to be suppressed. The very idea of taking a vote portrays disagreement as 
reasonable; it is not necessary to invoke bad faith, ignorance, or latent self-interest to explain dissent. 
Secondly, it counts each individual equally, by treating each person’s opinion as a reason for deciding 
in the way that the individual prefers. As Waldron puts it, majority-decision ‘attempts to give each 
individual’s view the greatest weight possible in this process compatible with an equal weight for the 
views of each of the others’ (LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 114). Waldron concludes that legislation by 
representative assembly enjoys greater democratic legitimacy than judicial review, since it provides ‘a 
reasonable approximation of the use of [majority-decision] as a decision-making procedure among the 
citizenry as a whole’ (The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 1388). 
73 JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 395. 
74 FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 1, at 17. 
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not signify contempt for or disregard of any group within the community. 
But if democracy does not demand majoritarianism as a theoretical ideal, 
then why should statistical equality feature even as a starting-point? It is as 
if, after expressly rejecting the majoritarian conception of democracy, 
Dworkin is unable to completely escape its grasp.75 
I find this feature of Dworkin’s theory curious: Dworkin seems not to 
follow through with his own ‘interpretive’ methodology. While 
appreciating that a normative study of democracy must take the form of an 
interpretation of a practice, he takes an overly narrow view of what that 
practice consists of. In his discussion of the ‘symbolic’ value of democracy, 
Dworkin focuses his attention on elections; indeed, he goes as far as to 
equate the symbolic value with the assertion of equality inherent in a one-
person-one-vote electoral system. After identifying this positive symbolic 
value of elections, Dworkin then treats the symbolic significance of all 
departures from majoritarianism in purely negative terms, asking only 
whether they detract from the equality that equal voting rights establish. By 
focusing so squarely on the symbolic value of elections, Dworkin fails to 
consider whether other parts of the democratic process have a positive 
symbolic significance.76 The benefits secured by departures from 
plebiscitarianism – representative government, judicial review, and so on – 
are treated as merely instrumental. He fails to entertain the possibility that 
non-plebiscitary forms of government might noninstrumentally express 
respect for citizens’ moral agency. Dworkin’s attempt at a constructive 
interpretation of democracy in fact only constructively interprets the 
practice of voting. 
The narrow scope of Dworkin’s interpretation leads him to adopt a 
 
 
75 There seems to be a parallel here with Dworkin’s early treatment of utilitarianism in Why Bakke has 
no Case, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, October 11, 1977, at 11: despite criticizing utilitarianism for 
ignoring individual rights, Dworkin seemed to rely on a background utilitarian conception of the 
common good. For criticism, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 135-
47 (1982). 
76 In places Dworkin has suggested a positive noninstrumental expressive value for judicial review. For 
example: 
 
‘[Judicial review] calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the forum of 
principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts between 
individual and society will once, someplace, finally, become questions of justice. I do not call 
that religion or prophesy. I call it law.’ 
 
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 518 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
Claims like this, however, dropped out of his later work, perhaps following accusations that he was 
presenting a ‘rosy’ picture of courts not matched by his ‘cynical’ picture of legislatures. See, e.g., 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 31-2 (1999). In any event, Dworkin fails to consider 
whether representative government may have any positive noninstrumental significance. 
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‘vote-centric’77 view of democratic politics which seems better suited to 
aggregative theories of democracy than to his own ‘partnership conception’. 
Dworkin presents legislatures as ‘the battleground of power politics,’78 with 
the primary function of aggregating private interests so that decisions on 
‘choice-sensitive’ issues are made in a manner roughly corresponding to the 
preferences of the majority79 and a secondary, negative function of guarding 
against ‘dangerous swings in public opinion.’80 This model of the legislature 
is familiar from those ‘interest group’ theorists who have viewed democratic 
politics as consisting mainly of a clash between competing self-interested 
groups.81 But the interest group model fails on both interpretative 
dimensions: As an account of modern democracy it is neither descriptively 
realistic nor normatively desirable. 
Descriptively speaking, as Waldron has pointed out, the supposed 
inability of elected representatives to engage responsibly with matters of 
principle has been exaggerated. Waldron gives the example of the UK 
Parliament in the 1960s debating controversial moral issues such as 
abortion, homosexuality, capital punishment, obscenity and prostitution.82 
The Parliament passed a raft of liberalizing legislation, often against the 
wishes of the majority of the public, following reasoned (and reasonable) 
debates on the matters of moral and political principle involved (without, 
Waldron adds, the distraction of ‘issues about interpretive technique, or 
issues about precedent or jurisdiction or other legalisms’83). Although 
legislatures clearly do not always act in such a responsible way, such 
examples show that they are capable of acting as fora of principle, at least 
some of the time. 
Waldron’s anecdotal observations gain support from the findings of 
more systematic studies showing that interest group theory has under-
appreciated the level of interaction between legislative debate and 
individual political beliefs: far from merely giving expression to pre-
existing public views, the reasons given by legislators in support of (or 
against) government policy help shape the political principles that are held 
 
 
77 Here I use the terminology of Kymlicka, who contrasts ‘vote-centric’ theories of democracy with 
‘talk-centric’ theories. See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 290-1. 
78 The Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 518. 
79 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 23-28. 
80 JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, at 394. 
81 For an overview, see Andrew McFarland, Interest Group Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS (Louis Sandy Maisel et al eds., 2010). 
82 Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 388-94 (2003). 
83 Id., at 393. 
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by ordinary voters.84 Here legislatures are aided by their distinctive 
institutional features: their large numbers of members and non-specialized 
function allow them to provide a forum for nonexpert deliberation involving 
inputs from a wide variety of perspectives. Unlike court proceedings, 
legislative debates are not detached from pre-existing public opinion, but 
nor do they merely reflect it mimetically. Legislative debate provides an 
opportunity for public opinion to be refined, to be given more specific 
content and to be brought to bear on detailed issues which require more time 
and attention than ordinary citizens are able to give. 
To best understand the normative shortcomings of interest group 
theory, it is important to note a distinction between merely widespread or 
general opinion, on one hand, and a truly public opinion, on the other.85 
While general opinion may simply be inherited from preceding generations 
or passively absorbed by the recipients of propaganda, public opinion is the 
product of active reflection and discussion. Public opinion can only arise 
where there exists a common space of discussion that allows people to share 
thoughts, beliefs and arguments without ever meeting in person or even 
communicating with one another directly. This requires citizens to have a 
certain self-conception: They must understand themselves as taking part in 
a discursive process that is oriented towards a common resolution. This is 
qualitatively different to a group of people who just happen to be talking 
and forming opinions about the same thing. Public opinion is irreducibly 
shared, rather than merely convergent, opinion. 
The ‘communal value’ of democracy—the idea that the laws are 
created by the collective agency of the people—relies entirely on the 
existence of a public opinion as opposed to merely general opinions. We 
can only view ourselves as a self-governing community if we see political 
power as answerable not simply to widely-held opinions about the general 
welfare but to a public opinion which is the common property of us all. The 
notion that our disagreements over particular issues take place within the 
context of a broader shared fabric prevents them from threatening our sense 
of common enterprise. As Warner has put it: ‘It silently transforms the ideal 
of a social order free from conflictual debate into an ideal of debate free of 
social conflict.’86 
Had Dworkin taken seriously the task of constructively interpreting the 
practice of representative government, he would not have seen the value of 
 
 
84 See, e.g., ARTHUR MAAS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983) (in the US); and PHILIP 
NORTON, PARLIAMENT IN BRITISH POLITICS (2d ed., 2013) (in the UK). 
85 CHARLES TAYLOR, Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS at 260-5. 
86 MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 46 (1990). 
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the legislative assembly negatively) as an instrumentally valuable reflection 
of/brake on majority opinion, but rather (positively) as reflecting a 
commitment to the idea that government ought to be steered by public 
opinion. Public opinion cannot be equated with the opinions that happen to 
be held by the majority of citizens and its content cannot be ascertained 
simply by empirical inquiry, opinion polls, or referendums. It is the opinion 
that arises when people, understanding themselves as a community that 
shares some common purposes, engage in a reflective and critical debate. It 
does not take the form of a list of principles or policy preferences, but rather 
of an ongoing argument and, as such, its content is a matter of interpretation 
over which citizens can be expected to disagree. While it manifests itself in 
newspaper articles, pressure group campaigns, barroom discussions and 
political protests, its content cannot be straightforwardly equated with any 
of its particular manifestations, since the nature of public opinion is such 
that any clam to speak in the name of the public is inherently open to 
challenge.  
For public opinion to be democratic, every group and class of citizen 
must be given a genuine hearing so as to be able to have a real impact on 
the debate (we can contrast the eighteenth century ‘republic of letters’). 
Such a debate is the ideal towards which legislative debates aspire, and is 
implicit both in the procedures for the composition and conduct of 
legislatures and in the role that legislatures play in the popular imagination. 
By representing inclusive and reasoned elaboration of a public opinion 
that is oriented towards a common good, legislatures can promote the 
communal value of democracy, i.e. the idea that the political community is 
collectively self-governing. Legislatures can also promote the agency value, 
by serving as the target of participation that connects the politically active 
citizen with the procedure by which significant political decisions are made. 
Taken individually, each citizen has a representative (or group of 
representatives) to whom she may make political arguments and expect a 
considered response.87 In its individualized nature, this mode of 
participation has something in common with participation as a ‘citizen-
claimant’ in a judicial review action, though it does not require the petitioner 
to speak the language of law, or to assert an individual right. However, the 
legislature is also the focal point of political action of an irreducibly 
collective kind, namely demonstrations and protests. As Norton points out, 
 
 
87 Here ‘expect’ carries a normative, not merely descriptive sense. It might be common, for example, for 
members of the public to say that they do not expect legislators to behave honestly. Here ‘expect’ is used 
descriptively. The fact that this is taken as such a biting criticism of politicians shows that members of 
the public do normatively expect honesty from legislators. 
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the continued relevance of Parliament in UK politics is shown by the fact 
that demonstrations against particular measures are held, not outside a 
particular ministry, but outside Parliament.88 This behavior cannot be 
explained in straightforwardly instrumental terms as trying to influence 
those who hold the levers of power, since, although Parliament of course 
has the power to make significant changes to government legislation, in 
practice it is extremely rare that it does so. The phenomena of protests 
outside Parliament only make sense when we take a broader perspective. 
Parliament is understood to be the focus for political activity and thus the 
proper place for attempts to garner public attention to a political cause. The 
aim is not simply to get MPs to act in the way that the demonstrators want, 
but to ‘send a message’ both to government and to the wider public. 
Parliament thus provides a ‘dignified site’ for interaction between citizens 
and the state.89 Even when it is perceived to be unjust, unrepresentative, 
even cynically self-serving, and even when its members are considered 
merely puppets of political parties and commercial interests, Parliament is 
seen as the proper venue for (attempts at) popular sovereignty. I do not 
believe the UK Parliament is idiosyncratic in this regard: The symbolic 
status of the legislature at the heart of democracy runs deep across western 
societies. If we view the legislature merely as an instrumental guardian 
against ‘dangerous swings in public opinion,’ we miss its true significance. 
VI. WHY IDEALIZE LEGISLATURES? 
The above does not, of course, describe how real-life legislatures 
always operate. Legislators do not tend to come from all sections of society: 
they are predominantly white,90 male91 and upper-middle class.92 They do 
 
 
88 NORTON, supra note 83, at 261. See also ROB BOGGATT, PRESSURE GROUPS TODAY, chap 7 (1995). 
89 See JOHN PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF DEMOCRATIC 
PERFORMANCE, at 94 (2012). 
90 The underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is a recurring trend in economically developed countries. 
Examples include Canada (19.1% of the population as a whole is non-white, 9.4% of legislators are non-
white); France (12.6%, 1.56%); the Netherlands (11.1%, 5.3%); New Zealand (33.4%, 22.8%); Sweden 
(13.3%, 10.9%); the UK (12.9%, 4.2%); and the US (36.3%, 22.8%). See Didier Ruedin, Ethnic Groups 
in National Legislatures, Harvard Dataverse (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17476. 
91 Data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that only 22.2% of parliamentarians worldwide 
are women. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments (2015), 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm. 
92 In the UK, over a third of MPs have attended fee-paying schools, compared with 9% of the population 
as a whole; 27% of MPs have an Oxbridge background, compared with 0.8% of the population as a 
whole (House of Commons Library, Social Background of MPs, Briefing Paper SN1528 (2010); SOCIAL 
MOBILITY AND CHILD POVERTY COMMISSION, ELITIST BRITAIN? (2014)). In the US, the median net 
worth of members of Congress is $1.5 million, roughly nineteen times the median net worth of 
Americans in general; the alumni of 13 prestigious universities constitute about 15% of the House of 
Representatives, but less than 1% of the population as a whole; and only 20% of legislators grew up in 
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not generally spend their time debating a representative selection of 
viewpoints on their merits, and all too often devote their time debating only 
two positions—‘government policy good’ versus ‘government policy 
bad’—picking sides solely according to the party to which they belong. The 
demands of the common good are often out-trumped by the interests of a 
few swing voters in marginal constituencies. A convenient scapegoat can be 
worth a thousand convincing arguments. It can be difficult at times to see 
how any of this respects citizens as intelligent moral agents. Furthermore, 
the formation of public opinion is not an egalitarian, inclusive, deliberative 
process; it is distorted, right at its center, by powerful media interests who 
often quite deliberately oversimplify, trivialize and mislead with the aim not 
so much to persuade the public to agree with them as to dissuade them from 
thinking at all. In light of all of this, is there any point in constructing an 
idealized account of legislatures? 
With respect to a given legislature it may well be the case that, if its 
shortcomings are sufficiently acute, it will utterly fail to provide any 
noninstrumental good. The best we could say about it then would be that it 
serves as a compromise between the symbolic value of equal vote and the 
practical need for quality of outcome (assuming it achieved even that). We 
would then have little reason to suppose that its decisions necessarily had 
any greater democratic quality than the decisions of a constitutional court; 
they might even have less. 
I would like to suggest, however, that, despite some rather acute flaws, 
the way in which legislative assemblies operate in modern western 
democracies is premised upon the idea that they are at least supposed to be 
arenas for reasoned deliberation, representative of society as a whole and 
firmly grounded in a reflective and critical public opinion. We overlook a 
vital aspect of politics—our interpretation of our practices is wanting—if 
we do not recognize these internal virtues of legislatures. 
So I do not deny that a version of Dworkin’s argument might succeed 
as a piece of nonideal theory, intended for particular contingent 
circumstances. Dworkin, however, does not develop his argument in these 
terms. His defense of judicial review is presented as an ideal constitutional 
theory, an interpretation that portrays the practice of democracy in its best 
 
 
working-class homes, compared with 65% of the population as a whole. Nicholas Carnes, Does the 
Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?, XXXVII LEGIS. STUDIES 
Q. 5 (2012); and NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN 
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 4-8 (2013)). Across the EU fewer than 4% of legislators are drawn from 
the ranks of blue collar workers, a figure which has been in steady decline since the 1950s. Heinrich 
Best, New Challenges, New Elites? Changes in the recruitment and career patterns of European 
representative elites, in ELITES: NEW COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Masamichi Sasaki ed., 2008). 
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light. As such, it fails, since it overlooks much of the significance of the 
central democratic institution, the representative legislature. In a sense, 
Dworkin is guilty of not taking his own methodology far enough: He does 
not portray legislatures in their best light, and thus misses the distinctive 
role that they play in the democratic ideal. This failing has potentially more 
than merely theoretical consequences. As Dworkin himself says: 
‘Interpretation folds back into the practice, altering its shape, and the new 
shape encourages further interpretation, so the practice changes 
dramatically; though each step is interpretive of what the last achieved.’93 If 
so, then interpretations of democracy that, consciously or otherwise, do not 
require the legislature to function as a deliberative and representative 
assembly run the risk of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Dworkin talks of the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of a democratic 
system, he should not be taken to endorse the instrumentalist view that takes 
the value of democracy to be exogenous to democratic practice. By 
including ‘participatory consequences’ as part of his ‘dependent’ 
conception of democracy, Dworkin recognizes the noninstrumental role that 
political practice plays in expressing political value: what amounts to 
‘insult’ or ‘respect’ depends upon shared understandings which afford 
significance to particular features of our practice. And with his ‘symbolic’, 
‘agency’ and ‘communal’ values, Dworkin identifies important normative 
characteristics of democracy: it recognizes citizens as equals; it is inherently 
practical and social; and it enables members of the political community to 
view themselves as collectively self-governing. Democratic citizens thus 
share an irreducibly social good which cannot be reduced to mutual benefit. 
When it comes to institutionalizing his theory, however, Dworkin 
adopts a curious starting-point: arithmetical equality of impact between 
voters. While this may be a reasonable starting-point for a theory of 
elections, it provides an overly ‘vote-centric’ perspective from which to 
examine democracy as a whole, better suited to aggregative theories of 
democracy than to his own ‘partnership conception’. It is as if, after 
expressly rejecting the majoritarian conception of democracy, Dworkin is 
unable to completely escape its grasp. The effect of this is that Dworkin 
ends up viewing any departures from plebiscitarianism as bearing 
instrumental value only. Yet representative assemblies, constitutional courts 
and so on are not merely practical expedients to improve the quality of our 
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political decisions, they are institutions that occupy particular places in the 
popular imagination. As well as being decision-making mechanisms, they 
are cultural symbols that condense many references into a single affective 
field, with courts representing the panoply of meanings associated with 
‘law’ and legislatures roughly representing ‘politics’. These shared 
background understandings frame not only the decision-processes, but also 
the very subject-matter and meaning of the decisions that fall to be made. 
I have argued that the distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ 
casts doubt on Dworkin’s claim that judicial review provides an arena of 
contestation that is ‘directly connected to [citizens’] moral lives.’94 Judicial 
review may dilute the link between decision and citizens’ sense of moral 
agency, and threaten the ability of citizens to view themselves as a self-
governing political community. Legislatures, on the other hand, are not 
merely majoritarian institutions, but provide a forum for nonexpert 
deliberation involving inputs from a wide variety of perspectives. When 
they function well, they symbolize a commitment to government in 
accordance with a critically-reflective public opinion. As it overlooks this 
aspect of our practice, Dworkin’s interpretation of democracy remains 
incomplete. 
 
 
94 What is Equality?, supra note 1, at 29. 
